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Schroder: A Tale of Two Sales

A TALE OF TWO SALES: HOW A SECRET SALE REMAINS A
BAR TO PATENTABILITY UNDER THE AIA
Kris Schroder

I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation and entrepreneurship are embedded into the history and
fabric of the United States.1 It began with the founding fathers, some of
whom were notable innovators, such as Benjamin Franklin2 and Thomas
Jefferson.3 This tradition of innovation and entrepreneurship continued
with individuals from Henry Ford4 to Bill Gates5 spearheading new
technologies that would lead to drastic transformations to the United
States economy.6 Intellectual property rights are one of the major forces
driving innovation and entrepreneurship.7 Indeed, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office states that its fundamental purpose is to
“foster innovation, competitiveness, and job growth by recognizing and
securing IP rights through the delivery of high-quality and timely patent
and trademark examination and review proceedings.”8
It is against this backdrop of innovation and economic growth that
Congress passed a recent change to the patent law of the United States in

1. Entrepreneurs: The Backbone of American Economy and Society, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://online.rutgers.edu/blog/entrepreneurs-backbone-american-economy-society/
[https://perma.cc/6U3L-EPFH].
2. Rex Hammock, Benjamin Franklin Never Sought a Patent or Copyright,
SMALLBUSINESS.COM (July 1, 2014) (Benjamin Franklin had many inventions, such as bifocals, the
lightning rod, and the Franklin stove), https://smallbusiness.com/history-etcetera/benjamin-franklinnever-sought-a-patent-or-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/4ZLY-GYSQ].
3. Rex Hammock, Thomas Jefferson’s Views on Patents and Intellectual Property Rights,
SMALLBUSINESS.COM (July 4, 2014), https://smallbusiness.com/legal/thomas-jeffersons-views-onpatents/ [https://perma.cc/RC8E-BN23]; see also Joe Kissel, The Inventions of Thomas Jefferson,
INTERESTING THING OF THE DAY (Apr. 20, 2018), https://itotd.com/articles/2385/the-inventions-ofthomas-jefferson/ [https://perma.cc/L5P7-K95B].
4. Henry
Ford,
PBS:
THEY
MADE
AMERICA
(June
30,
2004),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/theymadeamerica/whomade/ford_hi.html [https://perma.cc/3FVW-XQG9].
5. Bill
Gates
Biography,
BIOGRAPHY.COM
(Apr.
2,
2014),
https://www.biography.com/people/bill-gates-9307520 [https://perma.cc/8QB9-C9CC].
6. James Titcomb, Windows 95 at 20: how Bill Gates' software changed the world, THE
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
24,
2015,
3:47
PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/microsoft/windows/11817065/Twenty-years-ago-Microsoftlaunched-Windows-95-changing-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/YXY5-YULA].
7. Lorenzo Montanari, IP Rights Promote Innovation and Prosperity, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2017,
8:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenzomontanari/2017/04/26/ip-rights-promote-innovationand-prosperity/ [https://perma.cc/6UC5-5BZL].
8. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2018–2022 STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_2018-2022_Strategic_Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9N7-E7RK].
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the form of the America Invents Act.9 The America Invents Act was
intended to help American entrepreneurs thrive by bringing their
inventions to market faster.10 After its implementation into law, one issue
involved the interpretation of a particular provision: does the addition of
the phrase “otherwise available to the public” to 35 U.S.C. § 102 imply
that the preceding collection of bars to patentability are public, or may
those bars continue to stay private as the interpretations of the old statute
had determined? This legal issue was argued in front of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc.11
Part II of this note will discuss the background of the on-sale bar within
patent law, the relevant statutes before and after the America Invents Act,
the intent of Congress when writing the America Invents Act, and a case
analysis of Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. Part III of
this note will argue that the Judiciary misread the intent of Congress and
suggest a change to the statutory language. Part IV will summarize the
note’s arguments and concludes that the proposed amendment will restore
the intent of Congress.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to enact laws
concerning the protection of intellectual property.12 The four main types
of intellectual property rights in the United States are copyrights, patents,
trademarks and trade secrets.13 For patents and trademarks, Congress has
delegated this duty to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the
“USPTO”).14 The patent system in the United States works in a quid pro
quo fashion, in which the USPTO grants limited monopolies in the form
of patents to inventors in exchange for a public disclosure of how the

9. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
10. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling
the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs
Create
Jobs
(Sep.
16,
2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim
[https://perma.cc/HCZ3-NA82].
11. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”).
13. Outline of the Legal and Regulatory Framework for Intellectual Property in the United States
of
America,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/info/outline/US
[https://perma.cc/J93X-58J6].
14. 35 U.S.C. § 1.
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invention works.15 The idea behind this exchange is to incentivize
innovation that will benefit society.16 Patents convey strong property
rights to a patent holder.17 They allow the patent holder to exclude others
from making the invention, using the invention, selling the invention, and
importing the invention within the United States.18 Nevertheless, not
every invention deserves these strong property rights.19 The USPTO
requires that an invention be a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.20 Additionally, the invention must be useful,21
novel,22 nonobvious,23 and it must be disclosed in the patent application
sufficiently such that a person with adequate technical background could
make and use the invention.24
The novelty requirement has bars that must be avoided in order to
obtain a patent.25 The statute for the novelty requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 102,
was drastically changed when Congress updated the United States patent
system with the adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (the
“AIA”) in 2011.26 In Section A, the novelty requirements under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 before the implementation of the AIA (“pre-AIA”) will be
analyzed. In Section B, the novelty requirements will be analyzed under
35 U.S.C. § 102 after the implementation of the AIA (“post-AIA”).
Section C will highlight case law interpreting the on-sale bar pre-AIA.
Section D will analyze amicus briefs and Congressional floor statements
regarding the adoption of the new language in the post-AIA 35 U.S.C. §
15. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (“The tension between the
desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to
deploy those resources is constant.”).
16. James Evans, Remembering the Real Purpose of Patents, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2013, 10:44 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/internet-speech/remembering-real-purpose-patents
[https://perma.cc/Z9NU-XGNV].
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
18. Id.
19. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring that the invention be a new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter).
21. Id.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (requiring that the invention be novel and sets out various exceptions to prior
art and bars to patentability).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (stating that a patent may not be obtained if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
the claimed invention pertains).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that a patent application “contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or
joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
26. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
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102. Section E will highlight the judiciary’s reasoning in an on-sale bar
dispute between two pharmaceutical companies that culminated in the
Supreme Court Decision Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.27
A. Pre-America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 102
The pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102 statute lists many requirements for
novelty.28 In pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), there are bars to patentability
for any invention that was (1) known by others in this country before the
invention by the applicant, (2) used by others in this country before the
invention by the applicant, (3) patented or described in a printed
publication in the United States before the invention by the applicant, or
(4) patented or described in a printed publication in a foreign country
before the invention by the applicant.29
Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) deals with bars to patentability by the
inventor.30 These bars to patentability are:
1. The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in the
United States more than one year prior to the date of application,
2. The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in a
foreign country more than one year prior to the date of application,
3. The invention was in public use in the United States more than one
year prior to the date of application, and
4. The invention was on sale in the United States more than one year prior
to the date of application.31

The language of this section is of particular importance for the public
use and on-sale bar and has been the source of much litigation, which will
be discussed in Section C.32 The pertinent language reads “... in public
use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of

27. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Lexis 2010).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Lexis 2010).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Lexis 2010) (“(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .”).
31. Id.
32. See Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Patent claims
invalidated based on “sales for the purpose of the commercial stockpiling of an invention” that “took place
in secret”); Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S 55 (1998) (each detail of invention does not need to
be disclosed in order for a sale to act as a bar.); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829); Smith & Griggs
Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887) (“A single sale to another . . . would certainly have defeated
his right to a patent . . .”); Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F. 3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“Thus an inventor’s own prior commercial use, albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use or
sale under §102(b), barring him from obtaining a patent.”).
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application for patent in the United States . . . .”33
Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) deals with abandonment of an invention.34
Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) lays out a bar to patentability if an inventor
applied for a foreign patent more than one year prior to applying for the
patent with the USPTO and that foreign patent was issued before the
application to the USPTO was filed.35 Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) lays
out a bar to patentability in a situation where another individual describes
the invention in a published U.S. patent or patent application before the
invention by the applicant.36 Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) deals with the
instance in which the applicant for a patent did not himself invent the
subject matter to be patented.37 Finally, pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
describes interference proceedings, which occur in situations where there
is a dispute between two applicants about who invented the subject matter
first.38
B. Post-America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 102
The adoption of the AIA represented a drastic change to the patent
system in the United States, as the system moved from a “first to invent”
system to a “first to file” system.39 In a first to invent system, the law is
more concerned with giving patent rights to the person who invented the
subject matter first, as seen in the various provisions of the pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 102.40 In a first to file system, the law is more concerned with
granting benefits to those inventors who disclose their invention first,
allowing the public to benefit from the quid pro quo nature of the patent
system faster.41 The change to the first to file system brought the United
States closer to harmony with most of the other patent systems in the

33. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Lexis 2010).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (Lexis 2010).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (Lexis 2010).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (Lexis 2010).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (Lexis 2010).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (Lexis 2010) (“In determining priority of invention under this subsection,
there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the
invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice,
from a time prior to conception by the other.”).
39. John Villasenor, March 16, 2013: The United States Transitions To A 'First-Inventor-To-File'
(Mar.
11,
2013,
11:54
PM),
Patent
System,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/03/11/march-16-2013-america-transitions-to-a-firstinventor-to-file-patent-system/ [https://perma.cc/993N-58GX].
40. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Lexis 2010).
41. Villasenor, supra note 39.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 11

896

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

world, who also use a first to file system.42
Post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) reads:
(a) Novelty; prior art. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention;43

Therefore, the current bars to patentability include:
1. The invention was patented or described in a printed publication before
the filing date of the claimed invention,
2. The invention was in public use before the effective filing date, and
3. The invention was on sale or otherwise available to the public before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.44

Post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) describes a bar to patentability in
which the claimed invention is described in a patent or published patent
application that was filed before the filing date of the claimed invention.45
Post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) describes the exceptions to these bars.46
These exceptions include disclosures made within one year before the
filing date by the inventor or by a third party who obtained the disclosed
information from the inventor directly or indirectly.47 Additionally, when
an inventor makes a public disclosure, that disclosure prevents subsequent
third party disclosures from acting as bars to patentability of the
invention.48
When viewing the comparable sections in the post-AIA 35 U.S.C. §
102 statute to the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102 statute, Congress added the
phrase “otherwise available to the public” to the public use and on-sale
bars to patentability.49 It is up for debate whether Congress intended this
additional language to cover unforeseen circumstances by which the
claimed invention become available to the public, or if this was a
clarification that the rest of the statute only applies when the claimed
invention becomes available to the public. The question is then whether
it is or is not implied that the on-sale bar should be for public sales only.50

42. Toshiko Takenaka, Harmony with the Rest of the World? The America Invents Act, 7 J. OF
INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRACTICE 4 (Nov. 11, 2011), https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article/7/1/4/870662
[https://perma.cc/ZCY9-Z6AP].
43. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Lexis 2010); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
50. The statute would then be read as, “or in public use, on sale [to the public], or otherwise
available to the public . . . .”
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C. The on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102
The idea of an on-sale bar provision began to appear early in the history
of the patent system in the United States.51 In Pennock v. Dialogue, the
Supreme Court tackled an issue around the public use and sale of an
invention before it was patented.52 The Court explained that “it would
materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts” to allow an
inventor to “sell his invention publicly” and later “take out a patent” and
“exclude the public from any farther use than what should be derived
under it.”53 In Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., the Supreme Court explained
that “It is not a public knowledge of his invention that precludes the
inventor from obtaining a patent for it, but a public use or sale of it.”54
Only a single sale is needed to defeat the right of an inventor to a patent.55
In Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reasoned that the policy behind pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) was to
encourage an inventor to enter the patent system promptly.56 Building on
this reasoning, the court held that an inventor’s own prior commercial use,
even if kept secret, constitutes a public use or sale and acts as a bar to
patentability.57
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. described a situation in which an
individual was marketing a computer chip that he had sketched out more
than a year before he filed for a patent application.58 The Supreme Court
held the patent invalid because the on-sale bar applied.59 The Court
described two conditions needed for the on-sale bar to apply.60 First, a
product must be subject to a commercial offer of sale.61 Second, the
product must be ready to be patented.62 A product can be ready to be
patented either by 1) having been reduced to practice in the form of a
prototype or by 2) having prepared drawings or descriptions detailed
enough such that a person having ordinary skill in the art would be
enabled to practice the invention.63
In Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., the Federal Circuit invalidated a

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829).
Id.
Id. at 19.
97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877).
Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 257 (1887).
148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id.
525 U.S. 55 (1998).
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 67-68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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patent due to the on-sale bar because the inventor had contracted with a
supplier to mass produce and stockpile the product in secret more than
one year before the patent application.64 It is important to note that in this
instance the supplier and the inventor were not the same entity because if
they were the same entity, the on-sale bar would not have applied.65
The on-sale bar clearly applied to secret sales prior to the adoption of
the AIA.66 However, the addition of the phrase “otherwise available to the
public” into 35 U.S.C. § 102 has complicated the interpretation.67
Supreme Court case-law provides guidance when interpreting statutory
revisions. In Shapiro v. United States, the Supreme Court held that when
Congress adopted language in a new legislative act that was used in a
prior legislative act, Congress also adopted the judicial interpretation of
such language and made it a part of the new legislative act.68 The Court
in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez held that “the doctrine of congressional
ratification applies only when Congress reenacts a statute without
relevant change.”69 In Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court, in a
5-4 decision, refused to extend the protection of a statute that had been
reenacted without “language expressly suggesting Congress intended that
approach.”70 The dissenting opinion by Justice Sotomayor reasoned that
textual and contextual reasoning was enough to conclude Congressional
intent in this instance.71 In Federal Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., the Supreme Court refused to extend a statute that had changed due
to the context provided by the legislative history.72
D. Congressional intent in the post-America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 102
There are differing opinions in the legal world about how much weight
legislative history should be given when interpreting a statute.73 On one
hand, some attorneys worry that “a legislative history can allow for
manipulation, meaning a judge can find what he or she is looking for

64. Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
65. Id. at 1357.
66. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
68. 335 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1948).
69. 566 U.S. 583, 592-593 (2012).
70. 572 U.S. 434 453 (2014).
71. Id. at 477.
72. 411 U.S. 726, 735 (1973).
73. Lauren Mattiuzzo, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation, HEINONLINE: BLOG (Mar.
22, 2018), https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2018/03/legislative-intent-and-statutory-interpretation/
[https://perma.cc/RJ67-QJZ6].
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within the documents.”74 Other attorneys, however, feel that “sifting
through a legislative history will provide clarity to the original intent of
the legislation.”75 Additionally, proposed legislation undergoes many
amendments such that the final language may not adequately describe the
intent of the legislators when there is disagreement.76 Here, the
interpretation of the new statute was explicitly laid out in the legislative
history. 77 As such, the legislative history should be given more weight.
In the legislative history of the AIA, there are many interesting
comments by members of Congress involved in drafting and amending
the legislation.78 Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator Patrick Leahy were
both quoted on the floor during an AIA clarification session.79 Senator
Hatch was quoted as stating: “If a disclosure resulting from the inventor’s
actions is not one that is enabled, or is not made available to the public,
then such a disclosure would not constitute patent-defeating prior art
under 102(a) in the first place.”80 Senator Leahy further clarified:
One of the implications of the point we are making is that subsection 102(a)
was drafted in part to do away with precedent under current law that private
offers for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in the United
States that result in a product or service that is then made public may be
deemed patent-defeating prior art. That will no longer be the case. In effect,
the new paragraph 102(a)(1) imposes an overarching requirement for
availability to the public, that is a public disclosure, which will limit
paragraph 102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public
accessibility standard that is well-settled in current law, especially case law
of the Federal Circuit.81

The on-sale bar further appeared in other floor hearings discussing the
AIA. Senator Jon Kyl from Arizona said:
Another one of the bill’s clear improvements over current law is its
streamlined definition of the term ‘‘prior art.’’ Public uses and sales of an
invention will remain prior art, but only if they make the invention
available to the public. An inventor’s confidential sale of his invention, his

74. Id. (citing Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE
L.J.
371,
379
(1987),
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/duklr1987&id=387&collection=journals).
75. Id. (citing Matthew B. Todd, Avoiding Judicial In-Activism: The Use of Legislative History to
Determine Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 189, 222 (2006),
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/wasbur46&id=195&collection=journals).
76. Id.
77. 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).
78. See generally 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (2011); 157 CONG. REC.
S5431 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. H4429 (2011).
79. 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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demonstration of its use to a private group, or a third party’s unrestricted
but private use of the invention will no longer constitute private art. Only
the sale or offer for sale of the invention to the relevant public or its use in
a way that makes it publicly accessible will constitute prior art. The main
benefit of the AIA public availability standard of prior art is that it is
relatively inexpensive to establish the existence of events that make an
invention available to the public. Under current law, depositions and
litigation discovery are required in order to identify all of the inventor’s
private dealings with third parties and determine whether those dealings
constitute a secret offer for sale or third party use that invalidates the patent
under the current law’s forfeiture doctrines. The need for such discovery is
eliminated once the definition of ‘‘prior art’’ is limited to those activities
that make the intention accessible to the public. This will greatly reduce
the time and cost of patent litigation and allow the courts and the PTO to
operate much more efficiently.82

After the bill was passed to the House of Representatives and back in
the ordinary legislative process, Senator Kyl, being involved in
negotiations with the House of Representatives, also made clarifications
about the final form of the AIA that relates to the on-sale bar provision:
As Chairman SMITH most recently explained in his June 22 remarks,
‘‘contrary to current precedent, in order to trigger the bar in new 102(a) in
our legislation, an action must make the patented subject matter ‘available
to the public’ before the effective filing date.’’ Therefore, ‘‘[i]f an
inventor’s action is such that it triggers one of the bars under 102(a), then
it inherently triggers the grace period in section 102(b).’’ When the
committee included the words ‘‘or otherwise available to the public’’ in
section 102(a), the word ‘‘otherwise’’ made clear that the preceding items
are things that are of the same quality or nature. As a result, the preceding
events and things are limited to those that make the invention ‘‘available
to the public.’’ The public use or sale of an invention remains prior art, thus
making clear that an invention embodied in a product that has been sold to
the public more than a year before an application was filed, for example,
can no longer be patented. Once an invention has entered the public
domain, by any means, it can no longer be withdrawn by anyone. But
public uses and sales are prior art only if they make the invention available
to the public. In my own remarks last March, I cited judicial opinions that
have construed comparable legislative language in the same way. Since
that time, no opponent of the first-to-file transition has identified any
caselaw that reads this legislative language any other way, nor am I aware
of any such cases. I would hope that even those opponents of first to file
who believe that supporters of the bill cannot rely on committee reports
and sponsors’ statements would at least concede that Congress is entitled
82. 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (2011). Senator Kyl was one of the main proponents of the AIA, as
such his interpretation that prior art should be limited to activities that make the intention available to the
public is important.
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to rely on the consistent judicial construction of legislative language.
Finally, I would note that the interpretation of 102 that some opponents
appear to advance—that nondisclosing uses and sales would remain prior
art, and would fall outside the 102(b) grace period—is utterly irrational.
Why would Congress create a grace period that allows an invention that
has been disclosed to the world in a printed publication, or sold and used
around the world, for up to a year, to be withdrawn from the public domain
and patented, but not allow an inventor to patent an invention that, by
definition, has not been made available to the public? Such an
interpretation of section 102 simply makes no sense, and should be rejected
for that reason alone.83

In the House, there have also been discussions about the on-sale bar,
such as the comments by Congressman Lamar Smith referenced by
Senator Kyl above.84
However, not all of the representatives in Congress agree with the
interpretation. In her Amicus Brief for Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc.,85 Representative Zoe Lofgren from California
summarized the secret on-sale bar’s opposition statement as:
When Congress retained the phrase “on sale” without alteration in the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”), Congress clearly
intended to preserve the meaning of the on-sale bar as it had long been
judicially interpreted, including in many of this Court’s own cases. All of
the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation point to that result, including
the plain language of the on-sale bar and established canons of statutory
construction. The legislative history surrounding the AIA does not
undermine this result—it supports it. Congress considered several
alternative bills to the AIA that would have achieved the result for which
Petitioner now advocates: replacing the on-sale bar with a pure publicity
standard. Yet Congress did not adopt the language of those proposals and
chose instead to preserve the on-sale bar as it had previously existed. Both
advocates and opponents of the on-sale bar contemporaneously
acknowledged that retaining the bar also meant retaining its judiciallydefined meaning. It was only after opponents of the on-sale bar lost their
bid to change the AIA’s text that individual members of Congress delivered
floor statements (notoriously the least reliable form of legislative history)
pressing a creative interpretation of the AIA’s ultimately-enacted language
that would accomplish the very thing Congress had declined to do.
Petitioner’s legislative history arguments rely on these isolated floor
statements, ignoring the overall weight of legislative history and the
traditional canons of statutory construction, all of which strongly favor
83. 157 Cong. Rec. S5431 (2011). Senator Kyl highlights that any contrary interpretation to the
new 35 U.S.C. § 102 to the interpretation put forth by himself and Representative Smith would not make
sense when the intent of the statute is considered.
84. See 157 Cong. Rec. H4429 (2011).
85. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 11

902

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

Respondent’s position in this case.86

Representative Lofgren argues that the addition of “otherwise available
to the public” broadens the conduct that invalidates a patent and does not
constrict the range of conduct that invalidates a patent.87 Going into
further detail, Representative Lofgren states:
[R]eading “or otherwise available to the public” to modify the list of
established terms preceding it would be inconsistent with the canon of
statutory interpretation that applies when determining whether Congress
has changed the meaning of a term this Court has previously defined.
Supra, at 5-7. As explained, this Court expects that Congress will “provide[
] a relatively clear indication of its intent” to change a statute’s meaning
and disfavors “modification by implication.” TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at
1520 (quoting in part Madigan, 300 U.S. at 506). Yet “modification by
implication” is precisely what Petitioner thinks Congress did. Petitioner
would have this Court imply from the addition of the “or otherwise”
language that Congress intended to modify the meaning of every judiciallyinterpreted term of art preceding it, essentially a clandestine way of making
sweeping changes to existing caselaw. That is flatly inconsistent with how
this Court expects Congress to act when it legislates around its precedential
decisions.88

Later in the brief, Representative Lofgren alleges:
Simply put, Rep. Lofgren offered her amendment to retain not only the
words “on sale,” but also the meaning associated with those words, as they
had been interpreted by this Court and the lower courts—indeed, that was
the entire point of her amendment. Following her statement, Rep. Smith
announced his support for Rep. Lofgren’s amendment and encouraged his
colleagues to join him. Markup 102 (statement of Rep. Smith). Rep.
Lofgren’s amendment passed, thus blocking the attempt to remove the onsale bar from the bill in Committee.89

However, when going back to the markup, a different story appears:
However, the related change in the manager's amendment goes beyond
revising the grace period and also amends the definition of prior art in
subsection 102(a). I have now heard strenuous concerns about the broader
change from a wide range of stakeholders. In particular, they are concerned
about the deletion of specific categories of prior art with well established
meanings in case law and replacing those terms with a more ambiguous
term otherwise disclosed to the public. Now, I understand that the chairman
may be prepared to accept this amendment, and I would welcome that

86. Brief for Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 2,
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229).
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at 13-14.
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without further debate. I am not offering an amendment to replace the
section today because as we struggled to write something, it became clear
in discussion with leg counsel that this is too complicated to draft in this
time frame. 90

The amendment that was agreed to by Representative Smith was an
early amendment that automatically triggered the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
grace period when a 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) bar was triggered, not an
amendment dealing with the “otherwise available to the public”
phrasing.91 Additionally, the manager’s amendment that Representative
Lofgren was concerned about subsequently passed.92 Furthermore, nearly
two months after the Representative Smith’s alleged agreement to
Representative Lofgren’s interpretation of the on-sale bar provision,
Representative Smith authored a report and stated: “Thus, in section 102
the ‘in this country’ limitation as applied to ‘public use’ and ‘on sale’ is
removed, and the phrase ‘available to the public’ is added to clarify the
broad scope of relevant prior art, as well as to emphasize the fact that it
must be publicly accessible.”93 Representative Smith has been consistent
in this interpretation, stating in his Amicus Brief that “Most significantly,
the term ‘available to the public’ in new § 102(a)(1) now functions as a
terminal qualifier limiting prior art arising from ‘in public use’ or ‘on sale’
activities to what renders the subject matter defined by the patent claims
available to the public.”94
E. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. on-sale
bar dispute
The determination of whether the secret on-sale bar provision had been
removed or retained came to a head in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc.95 In Helsinn, a Swiss pharmaceutical company, Helsinn

90. America Invents Act of 2011: Markup of H.R. 1249 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112
Cong. 101 (2011) [hereinafter Markup] (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren) (emphasis added),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/20110414-house_judiciary_markup_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5A8-2L2M].
91. Markup, supra note 91, 102 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith). (“In that colloquy, the Senators
discussed the scope of the grace period in the bill. Senator Leahy expressed his intent that, quote, if an
inventor’s actions are such as to constitute prior art under subsection 102(a), then those actions necessarily
trigger subsection 102(b)’s protections for the inventor, and what would have been section 102(a) as prior
art would be excluded as prior art by the grace period provided by section 102(b).”).
92. Markup, supra note 91, 108 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith and Ms. Kish). (“Ms. Kish: ‘Mr.
Chairman, 29 members voted aye; 2 members voted nay.’ Chairman Smith. ‘The majority having voted
in favor of the manager's amendment, it is agreed to’”).
93. Markup, supra note 91, 42 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
94. Brief for Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 3,
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229).
95. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).
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Healthcare S.A. (“Helsinn”), entered into a license agreement and a
supply and purchase agreement with a Minnesota based company, MGI
Pharma, Inc.96 The two agreements included the dosage information, but
required MGI Pharma, Inc. to keep proprietary information confidential.97
The agreements were announced publicly, but did not disclose the dosage
information.98 Helsinn filed multiple patents relating back to the initial
drug, the fourth patent being effective in May 2013.99 Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. is an Israeli company and Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. is its American affiliate (“Teva”).100 They
both manufacture generic drugs.101 Helsinn sued Teva for infringing the
fourth patent relating to its drug.102 Teva claimed that the patent was
invalid because the dosage was on-sale more than one year before the
application was filed.103
The District Court reasoned that the on-sale bar did not apply because
“under the AIA, an invention is not ‘on sale’ unless the sale or offer in
question made the claimed invention available to the public.”104 Since the
public disclosure of the sale did not include the dosage, the court reasoned
that the invention was not on sale.105
The Federal Circuit reversed and explained that “if the existence of the
sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed
in the terms of sale” to come under the on-sale bar of the AIA.106
Therefore, the on-sale bar applied according to the Federal Circuit
because the sale of the drug was public. 107 The Federal Circuit relied on
Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.108 to make its decision.109 The court
reasoned that the question of whether there was an offer for sale must be
“‘analyzed under the law of contracts as generally understood’ and ‘must
focus on those activities that would be understood to be commercial sales
and offers for sale 'in the commercial community.’”110 The court then
looked to the Uniform Commercial Code and determined that “A sale
96. Id. at 631.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 632 (citing Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 3d 439,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27477, 2016 WL 832089, *45, *51 (D.N.J., Mar. 3, 2016)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
109. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
110. Id.
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occurs when there is a ‘contract between parties to give and to pass rights
of property for consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the
seller for the thing bought or sold.’”111
Other factors from Medicines that the court looked at include passage
of title, the confidential nature of a transaction, and the presence of
commercial marketing of the invention.112 In this case, those factors
weighed against applying the on-sale bar.113 The absence of regulatory
approval for a product in a sale does not preclude the on-sale bar from
being triggered.114 Helsinn argued that the floor statements of Congress
should be analyzed to determine the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a).115 The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument and declined to decide the case
more broadly than necessary.116 The court reasoned that no cases were
identified by the floor statements that would be overturned by the
amendments.117 The court further explained: “Even if the floor statements
were intended to overrule those secret or confidential sale cases discussed
above … that would have no effect here since those cases were concerned
entirely with whether the existence of a sale or offer was public.”118
Helsinn additionally argued that the “otherwise available to the public”
language requires that details of the claimed invention be disclosed before
the on-sale bar is triggered.119 The court relied on a case from the early
19th century, Pennock v. Dialogue,120 to determine that the on-sale bar
still applies when the secrets of the invention are withheld from the
public.121 The court reasoned that the floor statements must have intended
for the public sale to put the patented product in the hands of the public.122
The court cited a statement by Senator Kyl, in which he stated “once a
product is sold on the market, any invention that is inherent to the product
becomes publicly available prior art and cannot be patented.”123 The court
further stated that there are no floor statements suggesting that the sale
must publicly disclose the details of the claimed invention in order for the
on-sale bar to apply.124 The court concluded by stating that if Congress
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
27 U.S. 1 (1829).
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1371.
Id. (citing 157 CONG. REC. 3423 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl)).
Id.
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wanted to make a drastic change to the on-sale bar, they would have done
so by using clear language.125
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment.126 The
Court reasoned that “The new §102 retained the exact language used in
its predecessor statute (‘on sale’) and, as relevant here, added only a new
catch all clause (‘or otherwise available to the public’).”127 The Court did
not consider the addition of “or otherwise available to the public” a strong
enough reason to conclude Congress’ actual intention.128 The Court
refused to read the addition as a modifier because the phrase “on sale”
had acquired a well-settled meaning when the AIA was enacted.129
Therefore, the court determined that Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.130
was still controlling.131 This ruling therefore meant that “on sale” was to
be interpreted the same as the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), which
required that the invention was “the subject of a commercial offer for
sale” and “ready for patenting.”132 Under Pfaff, each detail of invention
does not need to be disclosed in order for a sale to act as a bar.133 The
Court relied on Shapiro v. United States134 to adopt the presumption that
“when Congress reenacted the same language in the AIA, it adopted the
earlier judicial construction of that phrase.”135
III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a)
is seemingly at odds with the explicit intent of the main congressional
supporters of the AIA.136 The Supreme Court reasons that the phrase
“otherwise available to the public” did not affect the meaning of the post-

125. Id. (citing Dir., OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 321, 103 S. Ct. 634, 74 L.
Ed. 2d 465 (1983)).
126. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 632 (2019).
127. Id. at 634.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
131. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019).
132. Id. The invention can be shown to be ready for patenting by proof of reduction to practice or
drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in
the art to practice the invention.
133. Id. at 633.
134. 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) (“In adopting the language used in the earlier act, Congress ‘must be
considered to have adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a part
of the enactment.’”).
135. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 633-34 (2019).
136. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. 628; 157 CONG. REC. S5431 (2011); 157 CONG. REC.
S1496 (2011).
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AIA 35 USC § 102(a).137 However, Senator Kyl, Senator Leahy, and
Representative Smith have argued that the addition of the phrase
“otherwise available to the public” had the purpose of removing secret
sales from the equation when considering the on-sale bar of the post-AIA
35 USC § 102(a).138 This section argues that the Supreme Court was
incorrect in its interpretation of the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a) and
suggests language that Congress could add to make its intent clear enough
for the Supreme Court so that the interpretation is in line with the original
Congressional intent of the AIA.
A. The Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted post-AIA 35 USC § 102
The Supreme Court declined to read the addition of “otherwise
available to the public” as a modifier because the phrase “on sale” had
acquired a well-settled meaning when the AIA was enacted.139 The Court
also determined that the language of the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a) had
the same judicial construction as the earlier pre-AIA 35 USC § 102.140
However, the primary sponsors of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act had a different interpretation. When discussing the addition of
“otherwise available to the public” and its effect on the on-sale bar,
Senator Leahy stated on the record that one of the goals of the revisions
of 35 USC § 102(a) was “to do away with precedent under current law
that private offers for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in
the United States that result in a product or service that is then made public
may be deemed patent-defeating prior art.”141 Similarly, Representative
Smith has been quoted in Congressional records as saying “contrary to
current precedent, in order to trigger the bar in new 102(a) in our
legislation, an action must make the patented subject matter ‘available to
the public’ before the effective filing date.”142 The intent of the authors of
the AIA were made clear on the floor of Congress in both chambers prior
to voting. If a disagreement in this interpretation was present, it could
have been addressed in the form of an amendment by another
Congressman. While Congresswoman Lofgren did raise concerns and
suggest an amendment, that amendment was never passed. Therefore, the
intent of Congress was that “otherwise available to the public” lined up
with the interpretation of the cosponsors of the bill.
On one side, the Supreme Court alleges that Congressional addition of
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 633-34.
157 CONG. REC. S5431 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 632 (2019).
Id. at 634.
157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).
157 CONG. REC. S5320 (2011).
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“otherwise available to the public” does not modify the preceding
language in 35 USC § 102(a) and that the statute’s construction is the
same as before the AIA. On the other side, Senator Leahy explicitly states
that the draft of the new 35 USC § 102(a) was done in such a way as to
“do away with precedent under current law” that private offers for sale
act as part of the on-sale bar. Further supporting Senator Leahy is
Representative Smith’s quote saying “contrary to current precedent” an
action must be available to the public to trigger the new on-sale bar. These
facts are in direct conflict with one another.
It is clear that the main cosponsors of the AIA agreed that the addition
of “otherwise available to the public” did away with the precedent of the
pre-AIA 35 USC § 102(a) on-sale bar construction. This amounts to an
overreach by the Supreme Court. The Court essentially ignores the intent
of Congress and instead opts to replace the interpretation of the new law
with the interpretation of the old law. The Supreme Court relied on
precedent that suggested “a sale or offer of sale need not make an
invention available to the public.”143 A sale or offer of sale that does not
make the invention available to the public is a private sale. Congressional
intent was to get rid of the private sale as a bar to patentability. Therefore,
the precedent that the Supreme Court relied upon to make their
interpretation was not valid.
This leads to an analysis of what the Supreme Court thought the
addition of “otherwise available to the public” was meant to do. The Court
stated that the addition of “otherwise available to the public” was meant
to capture “material that does not fit neatly into the statute’s enumerated
categories but is nevertheless meant to be covered.”144 This interpretation
is both broad and vague. Material that does not fit neatly into the statute’s
enumerated categories is not discussed by Congress. This interpretation
essentially gives the Judiciary free reign to decide whether material was
“meant to be covered” or not. Essentially, the Judiciary has given itself
the power to erase Congressional intent and replace it with Judicial intent.
The Supreme Court claimed that “otherwise available to the public”
was a broad catchall phrase. If the intent of Congress when authoring the
statute was considered, it is clear that the interpretation of “otherwise
available to the public” is actually narrowing, as it is meant to narrow “on
sale” to only sales that are public.

143. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 633.
144. Id. at 634.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss3/11

18

Schroder: A Tale of Two Sales

2020]

A TALE OF TWO SALES

909

B. A proposed change to 35 USC § 102(a) that removes private sales as
a bar.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 35 USC §
102(a) and Congressional interpretation of 35 USC § 102(a) are at odds
with one another. Since it is unlikely that the Supreme Court reverses its
own opinion, the way to align the state of the law with the original
Congressional intent is for Congress to amend the statute. This note
recommends removing “otherwise available to the public” altogether to
remove the apparent ambiguity and replace it with “to public”
immediately after “on sale”. The statute would read like this:
(a) Novelty; prior art. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, or on sale to the public before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention;

This change would unquestionably bring the meaning of the statute
within the original intent of the AIA by removing secret or private sales
from the bar to patentability under 35 USC § 102(a). This amendment
would result in a phrase that is clear in its meaning.
IV. CONCLUSION
Obtaining a patent is an expensive process, especially for a small
business or entrepreneur that is dealing with a limited budget and limited
cash flow. The AIA was intended to help entrepreneurs and small
businesses. One way it was intended to accomplish this was by allowing
flexibility in the form of allowing secret sales. Allowing secret sales
would allow small businesses and entrepreneurs to increase their budgets
and cash flows in anticipation of patenting. Large Fortune 500 companies
have plenty of cash, so they can play it safe and file patents when there is
an invention ready for patenting.
Even more expensive than obtaining a patent is patent litigation. A
patent owner will bring infringement claims to court with hopes of
obtaining large amount of damages that will make their litigation costs
worth it. When faced with a claim of patent infringement, a common
strategy is to argue that the patent is invalid and should not have been
granted in the first place. One way to do this is by applying one of the
novelty bars described in 35 USC § 102. When Congress tried to narrow
the on-sale bar to only encompass sales available to the public, it was
essentially strengthening patents and making them harder to invalidate.
As innovation powers forward in all fields of technology within the
United States, many large companies have run into many patent litigation
issues with smaller patent holders. Thus, there was an incentive for the
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large companies to push forward questions regarding the on-sale bar after
the implementation of the AIA in the Judiciary, as the old interpretation
of the statute was more beneficial to them.
The Supreme Court ultimately decided the interpretation of 35 USC §
102(a) in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., where it
decided that the addition of “otherwise available to the public” was not
intended to change the meaning of the statute. However, records from the
floor of both chambers of Congress suggest that Congress did in fact
intend for the addition of “otherwise available to the public” to remove
private or secret sales from the on-sale bar. When considering these
statements, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court incorrectly
interpreted the statute. A simple Congressional amendment to the statute
by changing “on sale” to “on sale to the public” could harmonize the
interpretation of the statute with the intent of Congress, but this time in a
clear manner that would not be up to the discretion of the Supreme Court.
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